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Abstract. We analyze the factors that inﬂuence the support for environmental policy pro-
posals. Swiss referendum data show that proposals obtain more yes-votes if they do not
restrict consumption possibilities directly, if they are endorsed by the largest business asso-
ciation, if environmental preferences are strong and economic conditions are favorable at the
time of the referendum. Also, there are more pro-environmental votes in cantons with higher
population density. On the other hand, yes-votes do not seem to depend on whether a pro-
posal involves a tax or not.
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1. Introduction
Even though research on environmental policy instruments is still mostly
normative, positive approaches are gaining importance. Since the seminal
contribution by Buchanan and Tullock (1975), theoretical arguments have
often been used to understand why some policy instruments are applied more
often than others. In particular, many authors have attempted to explain why
market instruments have been used less frequently than command-and-con-
trol regulation.1 In addition, some papers deal with the conditions fostering
the introduction of environmental policy in general, and green taxes in
particular.2
Even though the positive theory of environmental policy dates back to the
1970s, empirical work is scarce. Only a few papers analyze voting behavior in
environmental ballots (Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Fischel 1979; Kahn and
Matsusaka 1997; Thalmann 2004).3
Like these authors, we use referendum data to analyze which factors
increase the electoral support for environmental policy in a direct democracy.
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We consider 45 environmental referenda that took place in Switzerland
between 1977 and 2003. About half of these concerned transportation issues;
the others dealt with energy policy, landscape conservation and agriculture.
We start from the following set of hypotheses.
(H1) The smaller the negative eﬀects of a proposal on individual
consumption possibilities, the more yes-votes it will receive.
(H2) Proposals that tax consumers receive less yes-votes than proposals
that prohibit certain consumption activities.
(H3) The higher the share of voters with strong pro-environmental
preferences at the time when a decision on a proposal was made, the
more yes-votes it will receive.
(H4) The better the economic conditions at the time when a decision on a
proposal was made, the more yes-votes it will receive.
(H5) The greater the positive eﬀects of a proposal on the environment, the
more yes-votes it will receive.
In the working paper (Halbheer et al. 2003), we derive most of these
hypotheses from a simple formal model where voters consider the costs and
beneﬁts of policies, but as the hypotheses are suﬃciently intuitive, we refrain
from such a derivation in this paper. (H1), (H3) and (H5) are the most direct
reﬂections of the idea that voters consider costs and beneﬁts of a proposal.
(H4) requires an additional normality assumption on environmental goods.
(H2) is suggested by the widespread idea that command-and-control regu-
lation has more political support than environmental taxes.4
We test (H1)–(H4) by relating the percentage of yes-votes in a particular
canton in a particular referendum to a number of explanatory variables
chosen with the above hypotheses in mind.
As there are no simple and generally accepted techniques to measure the
eﬀects of environmental proposals on consumption, we use dummy variables
to test (H1). We distinguish between three types of costs that a voter might
associate with an environmental proposal. First, some proposals directly
reduce consumer sovereignty by making it impossible to pursue a particular
consumption activity. Obvious candidates are driving prohibitions on certain
days or proposals to abandon highway projects.5 Second, some proposals
involve tax increases. Most obviously, this is true when a proposal contains
environmental taxes. In addition, public projects such as measures to
improve railway transportation may be perceived as implying tax increases,
because they require ﬁnancing.6 Third, a project might inﬂuence consumption
opportunities by aﬀecting economic conditions more generally. If an envi-
ronmental proposal is expected to inhibit economic growth, for instance, by
inducing relocation of industries to other countries, it is less likely to be
accepted, other things being equal. To identify such proposals, we use the
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oﬃcial voting recommendations of the largest business association: When
this organization does not endorse a project, we take this as a negative sign
for the overall economic impact. Summing up, our empirical model distin-
guishes between three diﬀerent types of cost variables: Consumer sovereignty
dummies capturing direct restrictions on consumer choice, tax dummies and a
general economic impact dummy. This dummy approach also allows us to test
(H2), which suggests that, other things equal, taxation should have stronger
negative eﬀects on pro-environmental votes than a restriction of consumer
sovereignty.
We approach (H3) by including a variable measuring the importance that
society puts on environmental problems. This variable can be obtained from
a yearly survey in which Swiss citizens are asked which political issues they
consider as important. Finally, to test (H4), we use the temporal and regional
variation in economic growth and unemployment.
As we have not been able to construct a meaningful variable to measure
the impact of a proposal on the environment, we make no attempt to test
(H5) directly. However, we can obtain at least some evidence on the relation
between environmental eﬀects and yes-votes by exploiting the variation in
cantonal population density. A higher population density is likely to corre-
spond to greater environmental problems, which suggests that the potential
beneﬁts of environmental improvements in such areas are perceived as par-
ticularly high. We should thus expect more yes-votes in densely populated
areas. However, such a relation might also reﬂect higher economic costs of
environmental measures in rural areas. In particular, the adverse eﬀects of
restrictive policies towards private road transportation are likely to be per-
ceived as higher by the inhabitants of rural areas than by city residents.
Either way, cost-beneﬁt considerations would suggest more pro-environ-
mental votes in densely populated areas.
The main results of our empirical analysis are as follows. First, the con-
sumer sovereignty variables have strong and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
percentage of yes-votes. This suggests that proposals involving no direct
restriction on consumer sovereignty have much better chances of being
accepted than measures that restrict choices. Second, projects with positive
‘‘general economic impact’’ receive more yes-votes. Third, in times when
environmental problems are considered to be important, environmental
proposals meet with high support. In this sense, stated preferences corre-
spond to those revealed through voting behavior in the ballots. Fourth,
regional diﬀerences in voting behavior are closely related to characteristics
that would suggest diﬀerences in preferences for the environment: Population
density has a highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on acceptance chances.
Our approach diﬀers from the above-mentioned empirical literature in
several ways. For instance, Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) study 16 ballots in
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California. However, unlike our study, they do not deal with the eﬀects of
properties of the proposal on its acceptance chances. Instead, they are mainly
concerned with the eﬀects of voter characteristics on their behavior. Like our
approach, however, they start from the idea that individuals weigh the costs
and beneﬁts when they decide on environmental proposals.7
Thalmann (2004) deals with three energy-tax referenda that took place
in Switzerland in September 2000.8 Like Kahn and Matsusaka, Thalmann
focusses on the relation between voter characteristics and their behavior in
the ballots, though he also asks how characteristics of the proposal such as
the type of revenue recycling inﬂuence voter behavior. In contrast to
Thalmann, our study is silent about the eﬀects of voter characteristics on
their behavior. However, because of the relatively large number of dif-
ferent proposals in our sample, we can say more about the relationship
between the characteristics of the proposal and the electoral support it
receives.
Our analysis is also related to a study by Vatter et al. (2000) who analyzes
voter behavior in 27 Swiss referenda on transportation issues. Most of these
referenda are included in our data set. However, our analysis diﬀers in several
respects. First, we deleted some transportation proposals without direct
environmental repercussions. Second, we added referenda on environmental
issues not directly related to transportation (energy policy, landscape pres-
ervation and agriculture). Third, most importantly, our approach is moti-
vated by economic analysis. We attempt to rely exclusively on variables that
relate directly to the contents of the proposal or to environmental preferences
and the state of the economy at the time of the referendum. In contrast,
Vatter et al. come from a political science perspective. Their explanatory
variables and hence their results have very little in common with the ones
we use.9
Our approach of employing a linear model to understand which factors
increase the percentage of yes-votes of some environmental proposals may
seem unusual. The potential diﬃculty arises from the fact that this model can
give a percentage of yes-votes outside the interval [0,100]. However, we will
substantiate below that this problem is not severe under the speciﬁc cir-
cumstances. Other authors who study voting behavior in environmental
ballots employ binary-choice models.10 Such binary-choice models are par-
ticularly appropriate when individual data are used to understand how voter
characteristics inﬂuence voter behavior, while we use aggregate data to
understand how characteristics of proposals inﬂuence the support they
receive instead.11
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric
model. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we give some descriptive
statistics. In Section 5, we present the regression results. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Econometric Approach
We use the following model to test (H1)–(H4). We assume that the percentage
of yes-votes of some environmental proposals depends on a set of control
variables and an unobservable error. Further, we assume that the model is
linear in parameters and that the error has mean zero and is uncorrelated with
each of the control variables. With the above hypothesis in mind, we partition
the control variables in cost variables, variables representing environmental
preferences and covariates reﬂecting the economic conditions. We further
introduce other variables capturing cantonal heterogeneity and a peculiarity
of the Swiss voting system. Though we consider only national referenda, we
employ data on votes at the cantonal level for each referendum.
2.1. COST VARIABLES
We introduce consumer sovereignty dummies, tax dummies and a general
economic impact dummy to reﬂect the costs of a proposal.
Consumer Sovereignty Dummies. We distinguish between three types of
proposals. First, there are proposals that restrict particular types of con-
sumption activities directly (for instance, by prohibiting to drive on certain
days or by abandoning particular highway projects). Second, there are
‘‘neutral’’ proposals that do not directly restrict any particular consumption
activity (such as a moratorium on nuclear power or a general program to
support energy eﬃciency).12 Third, there are proposals that involve an
extension of certain consumption activities (such as public transport).
To distinguish between these three possibilities, we introduce two con-
sumer sovereignty dummies. The ﬁrst dummy, CS0, takes on a value of 1 if
the proposal is neutral with respect to consumption possibilities, whereas the
second dummy, CS+, takes on a value of 1 if the proposal extends con-
sumption possibilities.
Tax Dummies. Again, we distinguish between three classes of proposals.
First, there are proposals that we associate with higher taxes. Some of these
proposals contain taxes on certain activities carried out by typical voters
(highway usage, energy consumption). The remaining proposals in this group
involve public projects which have to be ﬁnanced in some fashion, for
instance via tax increases. Second, we classiﬁed some proposals as tax-neutral.
Obvious examples include driving restrictions on certain days or restrictions
on landscape usage. Third, some environmental proposals tend to reduce the
need for taxes. If the proposal is: ‘‘ Do not build a motorway from A to B’’,
tax payers’ money is saved.13 To distinguish between the three types of
proposals, we introduce two dummy variables: TAX0 takes on a value of 1 if
a proposal is neutral with respect to taxation, TAX+ takes on a value of 1 if a
proposal is associated with lower taxes.14
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General Economic Impact Dummy. To measure the general economic
impact of a proposal, we use the recommendation given by economiesuisse,
the largest business association in Switzerland.15 If the association supports a
proposal, we take this as a sign of a positive economic impact.16 Thus, we
include a dummy BS, where BS=1 indicates that the project is backed by
economiesuisse.17
2.2. ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES AND ECONOMIC PARAMETERS
To account for environmental preferences and for the economic conditions at
the time of the referendum we introduce further variables.
Environmental Preferences. To capture possible exogenous variation in
environmental preferences, we introduce a variable that describes the per-
centage of the population with voting power that considers environmental
problems as important. This variable, denoted ENV, relies on a survey that is
carried out annually by the research institute GfS.18 For recent years, the
results of this survey were obtained from various issues of Sorgenbarometer, a
publication by Credit Suisse.19
National Income. The growth rate of real cantonal income in the year
before the referendum is included and denoted by GROWTH.20
Unemployment. Similarly, we include the cantonal unemployment rate
denoted by UNEMP.21,22
There is potentially a multi-collinearity issue: As the environmental con-
cern might depend on economic conditions, one should worry that envi-
ronmental preferences might be correlated with income and unemployment.
As detailed below, in most variants of our model (Model 2–4), we therefore
consider only one or two of the variables introduced here.
2.3. OTHER VARIABLES
We ﬁnally introduce two variables to capture regional heterogeneity and a
peculiarity of the Swiss system.
Cantonal Population Density. Rather than including a cantonal dummy,
we used a more informative variable, namely the cantonal population density
denoted PD, to capture regional eﬀects.23 For each canton, we ﬁxed these
variables at one level (1997), which is justiﬁed as the temporal variation is
negligible compared to the regional variation.
The Counterproposal Dummy. Our last variable is included to account for
the legal form of the referendum. In four cases, referenda on a proposal and a
– typically more moderate – counterproposal take place on the same day. We
introduced a counterproposal dummy CP to characterize the latter kind of
proposal.
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3. Data
3.1. OVERVIEW
Our analysis uses data on 45 Swiss referenda on environmental issues that
took place between 1977 and 2003. The starting point of this period was
determined by data availability, and there have been no referenda that touch
upon environmental considerations since 2003. Table I gives an overview
over the types of proposals in our sample. Twenty four proposals addressed
transportation issues, 13 dealt with energy policy, and 8 concerned landscape
preservation and agriculture.
Table A.I in the appendix contains more detailed information about the
sample. The column ‘‘%YES’’ gives the percentage of yes-votes for each
referendum. This information comes from the oﬃcial homepage of the
Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation.
In addition, the table shows the main explanatory variables. Except for
BS, the voting recommendations of the business association economiesuisse
(and its predecessor, Vorort), we had to codify the variables ourselves.24 For
the transportation policy proposals, we relied heavily on information com-
piled by Vatter et al. (2000). In all other cases, we used various data sources,
for example, major Swiss newspapers (Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, Tages-Anzei-
ger) and the oﬃcial homepage of the Federal Authorities of the Swiss
Confederation. In the next subsection, we shall explain our choices.
Table I. Breakdown of proposals by type
Main types of proposals Number
Transportation-related issues 24
Emission standards for motor vehicles 1
More restrictive planning requirements 1
Driving restrictions on Sundays 2
Support for public transport 6
Restrictions on highway-building 4
Taxes (highway usage, vehicle, mileage, gas) 8
Overall reduction of transportation 1
Speed limits 1
Energy-related issues 13
General eﬃciency standards 2
Energy taxes/subsidies for renewable energy 4
Restrictions on nuclear energy 7
Landscape Preservation and Agriculture 8
Restrictions on landscape usage 4
Support for eco-farming 3
Restrictions on genetically-modiﬁed food 1
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The column ‘‘CS ’’ refers to consumer sovereignty: The sign ‘‘)’’ corre-
sponds to proposals with a direct negative impact on a particular activity
(CS+=0; CS 0=0); ‘‘0’’ corresponds to proposals with no direct impact
(CS+=0; CS 0=1); ‘‘+’’ corresponds to proposals with a positive impact
(CS+=1; CS 0=0). The notation in column ‘‘TAX’’ has an analogous
interpretation.25 In the column ‘‘BS’’ (business support), a ‘‘+’’ corresponds
to proposals that were endorsed by economiesuisse and its predecessors
(BS=1); a minus corresponds to proposals that were not backed. In the
column ‘‘ENV’’, we gave the value of our measure of environmental pref-
erences when the vote took place.
3.2. CODIFICATION DECISIONS
We brieﬂy comment on our codiﬁcation decisions regarding consumer sov-
ereignty and taxes. The variable CS was codiﬁed ‘‘)’’ for the following
examples: (i) driving prohibitions on Sundays, (ii) proposals to abandon
speciﬁc road projects or reduce road building in general and (iii) for
restrictions on genetically modiﬁed food. The value ‘‘0’’ was given to the
following types of proposals: (i) measures aiming at reduction of energy
consumption in general, and nuclear energy in particular, (ii) landscape
preservation measures, (iii) general procedural proposals26 and (iv) proposals
that involved expansions in one activity at the expense of another one.27
Finally, the ‘‘+’’ codiﬁcation was given to proposals that (i) improve public
transport or (ii) tax heavy vehicles. The latter choice is justiﬁed by the per-
spective of the vast majority of voters who beneﬁt from less freight trans-
portation on roads, as this allows them to move more freely on roads. Next,
consider the TAX variable. A ‘‘)’’ was given to (i) most tax proposals and (ii)
concrete proposals to extend public transportation. The group where the
variable TAX takes value ‘‘0’’ contains the following types of proposals: (i)
proposals which neither involve taxes nor subsidies (e.g., driving restrictions
on certain days, speed limits), (ii) proposals where subsidies are to be real-
located between activities (conventional to organic farming, road to rail), (iii)
general procedural changes28, and (iv) heavy vehicle taxes.
The last decision was made because such taxes are not paid directly by the
typical voters.
4. Descriptive Statistics
4.1. YES-VOTES
Panel (i) of Figure 1 gives the percentage of yes-votes for each of the 45
ballots at the national level, in the order in which the referenda took place.
Two features are interesting. First, there is considerable ﬂuctuation in the
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data. Second, casual inspection of the ﬁgure suggests an inverted U-shape
for the yes-votes. In the time period during which the ﬁrst 35 elections took
place (1977–1998), there seems to be an upward trend. After that, there is a
considerable decline: None of the last nine proposals reached the 50%
level.
4.2. ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES AND ECONOMIC PARAMETERS
Panels (ii)–(iv) of Figure 1 collect information on the development of eco-
nomic parameters and environmental preferences. Panel (ii) shows that the
percentage of Swiss citizens who were eligible to vote and considered envi-
ronmental problems an important topic was between 70 and 80% until the
late 1980s. A decade later, this percentage had fallen to about 20%. Panels
(iii) and (iv) give the growth rate of real national income and the unem-
ployment rate at the national level.29 These ﬁgures clearly suggest a close
relation between deteriorating economic conditions and the decreasing
environmental awareness.
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Figure 1. Acceptance rates, environmental preferences and the two indicators reﬂecting
economic conditions at the national level.
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4.3. COST VARIABLES
Table II concerns the cost variables CS, TAX and BS. It summarizes the
frequencies with which each type of codiﬁcation occurred. For instance, there
are 19 proposals with neutral consumption and tax eﬀect (3 of which receive
business support, whereas 16 do not). The entries labeled ‘‘tax totals’’ give
the number of proposals with a particular tax eﬀect (e.g., there are 7 tax-
neutral proposals with business support and 21 tax-neutral proposals that are
not backed by the business association). The entries in the column ‘‘con-
sumption totals’’ have an analogous interpretation.
Note that there is considerable variation in the combinations of codiﬁ-
cations that arise: 11 diﬀerent combinations arise at least once; only one
combination arises more than ﬁve times.
5. Econometric Results
5.1. OVERVIEW
This section summarizes the regression results. First, we present four variants
of the model described above, which diﬀer only with respect to which inde-
pendent variables we included. We then sketch some robustness consider-
ations.
All of our four main models include the consumption dummies CS0 and
CS+, the tax dummies TAX0 and TAX+, the business support variable BS,
the population density PD and the counterproposal dummy CP.
However, the four models diﬀer with respect to whether the environmental
preference variable is included, as well as with respect to the economic
parameters considered. Model 1 contains the environmental preference var-
iable ENV as well as the real growth rates GROWTH and the unemployment
rates UNEMP at the cantonal level. We included this model in spite of strong
concerns that multi-collinearity makes the results hard to interpret. Because
these concerns appear justiﬁed, the remaining models restrict attention to a
Table II. Breakdown of proposals with business support by consumption and tax eﬀect
(entries in brackets categorize proposals without business support)
Cons. eﬀect Tax eﬀect
+ 0 ) Consumption
totals
+ 0 (0) 3 (1) 3 (0) 6 (1)
0 0 (3) 3 (16) 2 (5) 5 (24)
) 0 (4) 1 (4) 0 (0) 1 (8)
Tax totals 0 (7) 7 (21) 5 (5) 12 (33)
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subset of these parameters. Model 2 considers only the environmental pref-
erence variable ENV. In Model 3, we use the economic parameters
GROWTH and UNEMP, as one might expect environmental preferences to
be closely related to these economic quantities. Model 4 is similar, except that
it uses the change in the unemployment rate in the preceding year, DUN-
EMP, instead of unemployment rate itself.
5.2. THE MAIN RESULTS
Estimation results are reported in Table III. In all four models, the consumer
sovereignty variables CS0 and CS+ have positive eﬀects, and these eﬀects are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The interpretation is straightforward. Voters (in
their role as consumers) resent proposals that involve a direct restriction in
Table III. OLS estimation results employing cantonal data. Dependent variable is percentage
of yes-votes
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CONST 8.1057*** 11.3996*** 23.9762*** 23.3137***
(1.6496) (1.4364) (1.4444) (1.4201)
CS0 13.2427*** 13.7055*** 16.9702*** 16.5989***
(0.9848) (0.9774) (1.0542) (1.0631)
CS+ 12.1454*** 12.7416*** 17.2919*** 16.1651***
(1.4297) (1.4320) (1.5349) (1.5606)
TAX0 )1.1027 )0.7555 0.2531 )0.8851
(0.8808) (0.8797) (0.9664) (0.9791)
TAX+ )0.8666 )0.4738 3.6228** 2.0743
(1.3379) (1.3348) (1.4415) (1.4865)
BS 21.0829*** 22.4538*** 20.5224*** 17.1020***
(1.0751) (1.0250) (1.1845) (1.1477)
ENV 0.3173*** 0.2687***
(0.0200) (0.0165)
GROWTH )0.0418 0.1239 0.4957***
(0.1279) (0.1405) (0.1425)
UNEMP 1.0994*** )1.2427***
(0.2683) (0.2467)
DUNEMP 2.6136***
(0.5393)
PD 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0034*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CP 16.8738*** 16.2826*** 11.3915*** 11.0258***
(1.0586) (1.0346) (1.1028) (1.1058)
Multiple R2 0.5528 0.5460 0.4561 0.4552
Notes: 1,170 observations in all speciﬁcations; * = Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** = Sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level; *** = Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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their freedom to choose certain consumption activities. On the other hand,
there is no substantial diﬀerence in the percentage of yes-votes of projects that
have no direct eﬀects on consumer sovereignty and projects that expand it.
Also, the ‘‘general economic impact’’ captured by the business support
variable BS is as expected: Proposals with business support received signiﬁ-
cantly more yes-votes (in all four models, this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level). An interpretation along the lines sketched in the introduction would
work as follows. If a project has the support of the business association, this
is not necessarily only so because it caters to special interests: There may well
be at least a positive correlation between business interests and general
consumer interests. Put diﬀerently, if an environmental proposal has adverse
economic eﬀects, so that the business association recommends voting against
it, some consumers may follow this recommendation for fear of negative
eﬀects on their own consumption, job situation, etc.
There is, however, another interpretation: The business association rep-
resents the opinions of a particular group of voters (in particular, managers,
owners and, to some extent, workers in ﬁrms). In this sense, saying that a
project has business support amounts to very much the same as saying that
there is a non-negligible subset of voters that is likely to vote for a measure.
Other things equal, proposals that are supported by some groups of society
should receive more yes-votes. Nevertheless, this interpretation is not as
convincing as it may seem. If it were true, it should also hold with respect to
other important groups in society. We checked this by investigating the
Social Democratic Party (SP) that usually obtains between 20 and 30% of the
votes in parliamentary elections. It turns out that the SP supported virtually
all environmental proposals: Therefore, the SP recommendation bears
essentially no informational value about a proposal’s chances of success.
Thus, our alternative explanation of the impact of the business recommen-
dation may not be all that misleading.
The population density also conﬁrms the expectations in all models. A
higher population density leads to a greater percentage of yes-votes (again,
these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all four models). For instance,
the eﬀect of increasing the population density by 100 inhabitants per square
kilometer on yes-votes is estimated to lie between 0.28% (Model 1) and 0.34%
(Model 4). To repeat, this is consistent with a cost-beneﬁt perspective: In
cantons where population density is high, the beneﬁts of most environmental
proposals are relatively high and the costs are likely to be relatively low.
The tax variables TAX0 and TAX+ are usually insigniﬁcant. In cases
where the proposal itself is a tax this presumably reﬂects the fact that the tax
levels are typically not very high. In cases where the proposal is framed as
support for some public project, consumers may simply not be fully aware of
the relation between the project and possible tax increases.
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The counterproposal dummy CP has a highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
This is entirely plausible, because counterproposals are typically more
moderate than the original proposals.
Finally, we consider the variables relating to environmental preferences
and economic boundary conditions. In Model 1, the eﬀect of ENV has the
expected positive sign and is signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, GROWTH has a
negative eﬀect on the percentage of yes-votes, but this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
The eﬀect of UNEMP is positive and highly signiﬁcant. We believe that these
counterintuitive eﬀects reﬂect the fact that there are too many explanatory
variables in the model. Therefore, we now consider the remaining models.
Model 2, which contains only ENV, gives the expected result: The eﬀect of
increasing environmental awareness is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Spe-
ciﬁcally, a 10% increase in environmental awareness raises the percentage of
yes-votes by 2.7%.
Model 3, which contains GROWTH and UNEMP instead of ENV also
yields plausible results: The unemployment rate has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on yes-votes. The eﬀect of a higher growth rates is positive, but not
signiﬁcant.
Model 4 is like Model 3, except that DUNEMP was chosen instead of
UNEMP. Here, the eﬀect of higher growth is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Surprisingly, DUNEMP has a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects on yes-
votes. Figure 1 suggests why this might be so. First, except for a very short
period around 1990, when unemployment increased dramatically, the
unemployment rate was roughly constant. Second, the critical period also
happened to be a time during which many referenda took place, which also
received many yes-votes. Taking this together, it seems that the counterin-
tuitive eﬀect of increasing unemployment simply reﬂect sluggish adjustment
of actual voting behavior to the changes in economic conditions.30
It is also worth taking a brief look at the constant term. In particular, we
chose our independent variables in Model 2 so that values of zero for these
variables correspond to the worst case for the acceptance chances of the
referendum. The value of 11.4 for the constant term can thus be interpreted
as the percentage of voters in regions where the population density is close to
zero who vote for environmental proposals even when their contents and the
economic parameters at the time of the referendum make a yes-vote partic-
ularly unattractive.
5.3. ROBUSTNESS
We now discuss several critical issues that one might raise about our analysis.
In each case, we brieﬂy report some related regression results suggesting that
our original analysis is not misleading.
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5.3.1. Linearity
We related the percentage of yes-votes in a canton in a particular referendum
to a set of control variables using a model that is linear in its parameters.
Obviously, the predicted percentage of yes-votes obtained in this fashion
could, in principle, lie outside the interval [0,100] if the independent variables
take extreme values. A closer look at our regressions already suggests that
this problem is not severe under the speciﬁc circumstances. Consider Model
2, for example. As discussed earlier, the minimum value for each independent
variable is 0, which is also the worst case for acceptance chances. The con-
stant, which was estimated as 11.4, is thus a lower bound for the percentage
of yes-votes. On the other hand, take very favorable conditions for accep-
tance: Consider a counterproposal that has business support and does not
restrict consumer sovereignty, at a time where environmental preferences are
at the maximum (78%), in a densely-populated canton (Canton of Zurich).
Even in this case, our estimation predicts an acceptance rate in the region of
86%, which is well within the allowable range.
Even so, one might prefer using an alternative approach, for instance, by
writing the percentage of yes-votes as observed logits (that is, the natural
logarithm of the observed odds ratio) and regressing them on the same set of
explanatory variables. Re-estimating our model in this fashion led to similar
results. In particular, the sign of each coeﬃcient was unaltered and the sig-
niﬁcant variables in each model were the same.
5.3.2. Heterogeneity of proposals
Another potential problem concerns the heterogeneity of proposals in the
sample. In particular, the wide variety of topics addressed in the referenda
which is only partly reﬂected in our explanatory variables might lead to
worries about the potential inﬂuence of omitted variables. We dealt with this
issue by carrying out our regressions only for the transportation proposals,
which should reduce the heterogeneity problems. In a qualitative sense, the
results, which are not reported here, are similar: The signs of the coeﬃcients
essentially remain the same, and even the quantitative diﬀerences in the
values of the coeﬃcients are not extremely large.
5.3.3. Cantonal data
We carried out a nation-wide regression with cantonal observations as data
points. Alternatively, we could have considered regressions where all obser-
vations refer to the same geographical unit, for instance, the nation or one of
the 26 cantons. Including results from diﬀerent cantons in one regression is
useful, because it allows us to investigate the eﬀects of cantonal diﬀerences in
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the explanatory variables on the outcome of the referendum. On the other
hand, the independence assumption on error terms becomes problematic as
geographical units cannot be assumed to be independent draws from a large
population. Even though we control for diﬀerences in population density, it
is still possible that speciﬁc cantonal eﬀects inﬂuence the outcomes of dif-
ferent referenda in similar ways.
Therefore, we also carried out one regression with only national variables.
By and large, the results are similar.31
6. Conclusions
This paper has identiﬁed determinants of success for environmental policy,
using referendum data for Swiss cantons. Two cost variables have pro-
nounced negative eﬀects: Restrictions on consumer sovereignty and a nega-
tive ‘‘general economic impact’’. The fact that a proposal contains a tax has
no signiﬁcant eﬀects on voter behavior. Among the parameters describing the
situation at the time of the referendum, the environmental preference
parameter has the expected eﬀect. An alternative setting without the envi-
ronmental preference variable, but with unemployment and growth suggests
that the unemployment eﬀect on yes-votes is negative, whereas the growth
eﬀect is positive.
There are several caveats to our analysis. First, some potentially important
variables have not been included. Most notably, there is no direct measure of
the environmental impact of a proposal. However, the eﬀects of population
density at least suggest that yes-votes and positive environmental eﬀects of
proposals on the population are closely related. Second, the use of dummy
variables in cases where cardinal variables would be desirable also means that
inﬂuence factors that are relevant from an economic point of view are not
analyzed in full detail. However, the fact that we obtain some explanatory
value despite our crude independent variables is promising. Third, our
analysis treats the policy proposals as exogenous variables. To some extent,
however, they should depend on other variables of our model: For instance,
when environmental concern is low, proposals are unlikely to be very
ambitious. This eﬀect suggests that our analysis is likely to underestimate the
eﬀects of environmental preferences.32 Fourth, the use of the recommenda-
tion of the business association for the ‘‘ general economic impact’’ is worth
mentioning: Though we believe that our interpretation of the variable is not
entirely oﬀ the mark, we realize that this point is debatable.
Given the limitations of our approach, we hesitate to draw far-reaching
conclusions. One important aspect seems to transpire, however. The widely
held belief that market instruments ﬁnd acceptance less easily than com-
mand-and-control regulation must be taken with a grain of salt. At
least when consumers decide about proposals to restrict emissions from
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consumption, they are reluctant to accept a command-and-control regulation.
Taxes seem to meet with less resistance.33 Strictly speaking, this observation
is not in contradiction with standard political economy arguments that taxes
face greater resistance than standards. First, we should emphasize that
proposals with taxes include not only environmental taxes, but also subsi-
dized public projects that are expected to lead to tax payments. Second,
standard arguments usually refer to pollution by ﬁrms, whereas many of the
investigated proposals deal with consumption emissions (mostly by motor-
ists). Our analysis suggests that the political economy of consumption
emissions may diﬀer substantially from the political economy of production
emissions. An alternative interpretation is also plausible: Casual observations
suggest that, whereas some of the proposed command-and-control measures
were massive interventions, the proposed taxes tended to be fairly low. Had
voters been confronted with the typical textbook exercise of comparing a
command-and-control measure with a tax with equivalent emission eﬀects,
they might have preferred command-and-control measures.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our paper does not provide a
normative analysis. In particular, the fact that certain types of command-
and-control regulation seem to meet with more resistance than other
instruments does not in itself mean that they should not be applied. In cases
where alternative policy options are limited, it may well be a wise move to put
such instruments on the political agenda, even at the risk of failure. Never-
theless, our results remind us that it may be worth thinking very hard about
the way in which environmental goals are targeted, not only for eﬃciency
reasons: To sell environmental policy, it is important not to destroy the
goodwill of the buyers.
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Notes
1. Examples include Dewees (1983), Hahn (1990), Hahn and Noll (1990), Frey and Schneider
(1997), Kirchga¨ssner and Schneider (2003). Dijkstra (1999) and Keohane et al. (2000)
survey the literature.
2. See for instance Hahn (1990), Fredriksson (1997) and Polk and Schmutzler (2005).
3. Some authors have used questionnaires or casual empiricism to ﬁnd out the preferences of
diﬀerent groups with respect to abstract policy instruments. Examples include Dijkstra
(1999), Svendsen (1999), Verhoef (1996), Wallart and Bu¨rgenmeier (1996).
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4. Note, however, that this idea is usually derived in the context of environmental pollution
by ﬁrms rather than consumers. Also, in theory the distinction between command-and-
control regulation and taxes is not entirely clear-cut as very high taxes on particular
consumption activities could have the same economic eﬀects as outright prohibitions.
However, in our sample, there is no example of a tax that comes close to this description.
5. In this dimension, some environmental proposals also have a positive direct eﬀect.
Speciﬁcally, proposals to increase public transport introduce new consumption options.
6. By the same token, if a proposal calls for a reduction of public spending on projects with
negative environmental eﬀects such as motorways, it should be associated with lower
taxes.
7. The study uses heterogeneity of the population across 57 counties to estimate the eﬀects of
income and of the opportunity costs of environmental proposals on voting behavior.
8. These referenda are also in our data set.
9. They concern the amount of support by various population groups, the legal status of the
proposal, etc.
10. For instance, the above-mentioned studies on environmental ballots by Kahn and
Matsusaka (1997) and Thalmann (2004) use logit models. The same is true for papers
dealing with referenda on non-environmental issues (e.g., Schulze and Ursprung 2000).
11. Alternatively, we could have modeled the outcome of the vote as a random variable that
takes value 1 if the proposal is accepted and 0 if the proposal is rejected to examine the
factors that aﬀect the acceptance probability. However, this would involve ignoring
valuable information on the fraction of voters who accept a proposal.
12. Obviously, such proposals can have indirect eﬀects (e.g., by making energy more
expensive). These eﬀects will be captured by the general economic impact dummy below.
13. Obviously, we are talking about the direct eﬀects here. Possible detrimental eﬀects on
economic activity that may reduce tax revenue in the long run are captured by the general
economic impact dummy instead.
14. The logic of the notation TAX+ corresponds to the earlier notation CS+: In both cases, a
value of 1 reﬂects a positive eﬀect on consumers.
15. economiesuisse is the result of a merger of Vorort and wf and has the support of more than
30,000 businesses of all sizes, employing a total of 1.5 million people in Switzerland in
2005. For the early referenda, we use the recommendation of Vorort.
16. We shall discuss this interpretation below.
17. One might expect the impact of the endorsement by the business association to be
particularly strong when it represents a large portion of employees, so an interaction term
of this share and the dummy BS would be interesting. Because consistent data were
lacking, we could not follow this approach.
18. The research center GfS (Gesellschaft fu¨r Sozialforschung) is specialized in applied policy
research.
19. We are grateful to Marc Bu¨hlmann (Institute of Political Science, University of Bern) who
made available the data for the early referenda.
20. To construct this series, we employ data published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce
and the Swiss National Bank (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch and http://www.snb.ch,
respectively). Detailed information about the construction of this variable is available
from the authors upon request.
21. Unemployment rates were obtained from the Confederation’s State Secretariat for
Economic Aﬀairs. See http://www.seco.admin.ch.
22. A referee has suggested to use the change of the unemployment rate in the preceding
period, DUNEMP, instead, as one might expect voting behavior to react to the changes
rather than to the level. We will investigate this possibility below.
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23. Population density is measured by the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. The
data can be found on the oﬃcial homepage of the Federal Authorities of the Swiss
Confederation. See http://www.admin.ch.
24. We obtained the recommendations directly from those organizations.
25. See the Appendix for more detailed information.
26. For instance, this applies to a proposal to subject decisions on highway projects to a
referendum: Even though this might lead to restrictions on road building, we deemed this
eﬀect too vague to be considered here.
27. The typical example would be the expansion of rail transport with simultaneous reduction
in road transport.
28. Arguably, for instance, a proposal to subject highly subsidized nuclear power stations to
more complex planning projects might be expected to reduce subsidies, and hence taxes in
the long-run. We deemed this eﬀect to be too vague, however.
29. The cantonal data exhibit similar patterns.
30. The alternative explanation that the counterintuitive sign may be caused by high
correlation between GROWTH and DUNEMP is not consistent with the evidence, as the
sign does not change when GROWTH is deleted from the regression.
31. There is one important diﬀerence, however. In Model 3, the sign of the unemployment
coeﬃcient switches, with higher unemployment corresponding to more yes-votes. This
counterintuitive eﬀect becomes understandable by comparison with the cantonal
regression. There, the variation in the unemployment rate is regional as well as temporal.
In the national model, however, the variation is only temporal. Thus, the high
concentration of referenda with large numbers of yes-votes is in the early years of high
unemployment is likely to have a stronger eﬀect on the outcome than in the regressions
with cantonal data.
32. Also, treating proposals as endogenous leads to a mild reinterpretation of the signiﬁcant
positive constant in our regression: It suggests that proposals are chosen so that a
substantial baseline support exists.
33. Arguably, direct democracy might play a rule in generating these results. Elected
politicians might be willing to impose restrictions on consumer sovereignty even when
consumers would not accept such a proposal.
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Appendix
LIST OF PROPOSALS
Table A.I. Detailed information about the content of each proposal, codiﬁcation decisions,
environmental preferences at the time of the vote and the percentage of yes-votes
No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %YES
1 25/09/77 Pollution standards for
motor vehicles
0 0 ) 74 39.0
2 26/03/78 Possibility for optional
referendum on highway
projects
0 0 ) 74 38.7
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Table A.I. Continued
No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %YES
3 28/05/78 Prohibition of driving on
12 Sundays per year
) 0 ) 74 36.3
4 18/02/79 More restrictive conditions
for approval of nuclear
power plants
0 0 ) 73 48.8
5 20/05/79 Slightly more restrictive
conditions for approval of
nuclear power plants
0 0 ) 73 68.9
6 27/02/83 Measures to reduce
energy consumption
0 0 + 71 50.9
7 26/02/84 Highway usage fee 0 ) ) 71 53.0
8 23/09/84 Measures to reduce energy
consumption and support
renewable energy usage;
incl. energy tax
0 ) ) 71 45.8
9 23/09/84 Prohibition of new
nuclear plants
0 + ) 71 45.0
10 07/12/86 Heavy-vehicle tax + 0 ) 73 33.9
11 06/12/87 Landscape preservation
measures
0 0 ) 78 57.8
12 06/12/87 Extension of rail transport + ) + 78 57.0
13 12/06/88 General redirection of
transportation policy
towards public transport
0 0 ) 74 45.5
14 01/04/90 General restrictions on
road building
) + ) 70 28.5
15 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a
motorway (N1)
) + ) 70 32.7
16 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a
motorway (N4)
) + ) 70 31.4
17 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a
motorway (N5)
) + ) 70 34.0
18 23/09/90 General, non-speciﬁc
proposal to reduce energy
consumption
0 0 ) 70 71.0
19 23/09/90 Ten-Year Moratorium
on nuclear power plants
0 + ) 70 54.6
20 23/09/90 More stringent restrictions
on nuclear power plants
0 0 ) 70 47.1
21 03/03/91 Redirection of subsidies
from road to rail transport
0 0 ) 61 37.2
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Table A.I. Continued
No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %YES
22 03/03/91 Preservation of rivers and lakes 0 0 ) 61 37.1
23 17/05/92 Preservation of rivers and lakes 0 0 ) 50 66.1
24 27/09/92 Large-scale rail projects
(incl. trans-alpine tunnels)
+ ) + 50 63.6
25 07/03/93 Gasoline Tax Increase 0 ) + 47 54.5
26 06/06/93 Restrictions on the military
usage of landscape
0 0 ) 47 44.7
27 20/02/94 Road usage fee (prolongation) 0 ) + 47 68.5
28 20/02/94 Heavy vehicle tax (prolongation) + 0 + 47 72.2
29 20/02/94 Mileage-based heavy
vehicle tax
+ 0 + 47 67.1
30 20/02/94 Measures to move freight
transportation in the Alps
from road to rail and
restrictions on road building
0 0 ) 47 51.9
31 12/03/95 Constitutional support for
organic farming
0 0 + 31 50.8
32 09/06/96 Redirection of subsidies from
conventional to organic farming
0 0 + 20 77.6
33 07/06/98 Restrictions on GM food ) 0 + 19 33.3
34 27/09/98 Redirections of subsidies from
conventional to organic farming
0 0 ) 19 77.0
35 27/09/98 Mileage-based heavy-vehicle
charge (Details)
+ 0 + 19 57.2
36 29/11/98 Financing Proposal for
Railway Infrastructure in
the Alps
+ ) + 19 63.5
37 12/03/00 Proposal to reduce private
road transportation by 50%
in 10 years
) 0 ) 25 18.1
38 24/09/00 Tax on renewable energy;
subsidies for solar energy
0 ) ) 25 31.9
39 24/09/00 Tax on renewable energy;
subsidies for solar energy
(more moderate than 38)
0 ) ) 25 46.6
40 24/09/00 Energy tax 0 ) ) 25 44.6
41 04/03/01 Speed limit in towns
(30 km/h)
) 0 ) 15 20.3
42 02/12/01 Taxation of Energy
instead of Labor
0 0 ) 15 22.9
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Table A.I. Continued
No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %YES
43 18/05/03 Prohibition of driving on
4 per year
) 0 ) 14 37.6
44 18/05/03 Proposal to abandon nuclear
energy gradually
0 0 ) 14 33.7
45 18/05/03 Prolongation of the moratorium
on nuclear power plants
0 + ) 14 41.6
Explanation:
(i) The column ‘‘CS’’ refers to consumer sovereignty: The sign ‘‘)’’ corresponds to proposals
with a direct negative impact on a particular activity (CS+=0; CS0=0); ‘‘0’’ corresponds
to proposals with no direct impact (CS+=0; CS0=1); ‘‘+’’ corresponds to proposals
with a positive impact (CS+=1; CS0=0).
(ii) The column ‘‘TAX’’ refers to tax eﬀects: The sign ‘‘)’’ corresponds to proposals that
increase the tax burden (TAX0=0; TAX+=0); ‘‘0’’ corresponds to proposals with no
direct impact on taxes (TAX0=1; TAX+=0); ‘‘+’’ corresponds to proposals that lower
the tax burden (TAX0=0; TAX+=1).
(iii) The column ‘‘BS’’ refers to the recommendation of the business association: A ‘‘+’’
corresponds to proposals that were endorsed by economiesuisse and its predecessors
(IS=‘‘1’’); a minus corresponds to proposals that were not backed.
(iv) The column ‘‘ENV’’ gives the percentage of voters who consider environmental problems
an important topic.
(v) The column ‘‘%YES’’ gives the percentage of yes-votes.
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